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ABSTRACT
A Research Framework and Initial Study of
Browser Security for the Visually Impaired
Elaine Lau

The growth of web-based malware and phishing attacks has catalyzed significant advances in the research and use of interstitial warning pages and modals by a browser
prior to loading the content of a suspect site. These warnings commonly use visual
cues to attract users’ attention, including specialized iconography, color, and an absence of buttons to communicate the importance of the scenario. While the efficacy
of visual techniques has improved safety for sighted users, these techniques are unsuitable for blind and visually impaired users. This is likely not due to a lack of
interest or technical capability by browser manufactures, where universal design is
a core tenet of their engineering practices, but instead a reflection of the very real
dearth of research literature to inform best practices, exacerbated by a deficit of clear
methodologies for conducting studies with this population.
Indeed, the challenges are manifold. In this paper, we present the results of our study
analyzing the experiences of the visually impaired with browser security warnings,
detail the development and advancement of the methodological best practices when
conducting a study of this kind, and ultimately identify some initial approaches that
could improve the security for this population.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

The increasing prevalence of web-based malware and phishing attempts [4, 45] has
necessitated significant advances in the client-side detection of such attacks. It is now
common for web browsers to display an interstitial warning page prior to loading the
content of a suspect site. Following W3C user interface guidelines, warnings should
provide distinct options for how to proceed and a recommended course of action [66].
Specifically, the user can decide to either adhere to the warning and return to safety,
or ignore the warning and proceed with her original task [2].
Commonly, warnings use visual cues to capture the user’s attention and make the
“safe” option more attractive. Desolda et al. observe that the primary differences in
the interstitial security warnings in major browsers are visual in nature; these include
background color, the alert icon, the message text, and the placement and size of the
button for proceeding through the warning [20]. Bravo et al. detail a mental model
of warning response behaviors for advanced and novice users, and found that novice
users immediately pay attention to the look and feel of the warning [10]. In a set of
research-based guidelines for warning design, Wogalter et al. identify salience as the
first requirement for an effective warning, which is achieved by using bold type, adding
color, thick borders, pictorial symbols, and special effects [80]. Similarly, Bauer et
al. suggest a common visual layout for structuring information in a warning, which
includes a single icon that conveys the severity level of a message [7]. In a study
of Google Chrome’s SSL warning, Felt et al. attribute a dramatic improvement of
adherence rates to the use of opinionated design, applying visual design techniques
to promote a recommended course of action [23].
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While the efficacy of visual techniques has promoted safety for sighted users, these
techniques may be unsuitable to blind and visually impaired users. Many visually
impaired users browse the web with a screen reader, which converts text on the
computer screen to synthesized speech [37]. Such assistive technologies can make
websites technically accessible but not necessarily usable, leading screen reader users
to employ different browsing strategies to cope with usability problems [9]. Indeed,
the challenge of communicating security cues to this population is not unique to
web browser warnings [37]. Hochheiser et al. note that graphical passwords, icons,
images, and pop-up dialogs are often not interpreted by screen reader software [35, 37].
Further, screen readers cannot read image-based CAPTCHAs, which the W3C has
identified as a major problem for blind and visually impaired users [52].
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Web Security Context Working Group
(WSC) is the first standards effort in the area of usable security to provide guidelines for presenting security-related information to end users [66] with accessibility
as a top concern. For example, Zurko and Johar discuss possible additions to WSC
recommendations, including the use of aural interfaces in warning design [86].
The W3C Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI) also provides the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAGs), which are internationally regarded as the standard for
web accessibility. Petrie and Khier asked blind, screen reader users to rate the importance of usability problems on a website and found little relationship between the
participants’ ratings and the priority levels assigned to problems in version 1.0 of the
WCAG [61]. The match between actual problem severity and priority levels in the
latest version of these guidelines (WCAG 2.0) was also shown to lack empirical basis
when Romen and Svanes tested the usefulness of WCAG 2.0 as a heuristic for web
accessibility with a broader population of users with disabilities. Visually impaired
users, in particular, reported problems with redundant and indistinguishable links
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that the WCAG 2.0 does not address [65]. Their study suggests that conformance
to guidelines may not guarantee accessibility for all, and that there is potential for
improvement through more detailed research into how users with disabilities interact
with the web.
While existing research repeatedly illustrates the need to evaluate browser security
warnings for users with visual impairments, very few concrete solutions or paths forward exist. This may not be, exclusively, a reflection of poor technologies or researcher
disinterest, but rather indicative of a more fundamental challenge in conducting usable
security research with this specific population. As evidence, we have not found any
work related to appropriate research methodologies to use, nor the “right” questions
to ask, in such an evaluation. Challenges include ensuring ecological validity, providing an accurate account of experiences with respect to the vast variability in browser
security warnings and personal computer set ups, and participant recruitment—all research challenges that are not unique to the visually impaired population, but require
more consideration when conducting research of this kind.
In short, there is a gap in the literature with regards to how users with visual disabilities experience web browser security warnings, generally. Our work aims to fill this
gap.
The contributions of this thesis are threefold: (1) we investigate how individuals with
visual disabilities perceive and interact with web browsers’ security warnings and indicators, in an authentic setting, while also undertaking an inclusive security and privacy research perspective that captures visually impaired users’ security experiences
more broadly; (2) we reflect on the methodical challenges of conducting browser security warning research with visually impaired users, and advance the state of the art in
conducting research with this population; and (3) we draw upon our empirical results
to suggest some rudimentary technical solutions that may substantially improve the
3

security and usability of the web for visually impaired users. A long-term goal of
this study is to contribute toward conceptualizing and designing inclusive security
research methodologies and mechanisms with the needs and concerns of marginalized
populations in mind.

4

Chapter 2
RELATED WORK

To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that investigate browser security
warnings with users who are visually impaired. However, there have been several
studies over the past decade on the evolution of browser security warning effectiveness. Although our study is not squarely focused on testing browser security warning
effectiveness with users who are visually impaired per se, prior work has guided us
in asking our subjects important questions about their experience with generally
accepted criterion for successful warnings. Beyond browser security warnings specifically, there have been numerous studies investigating other security and privacy
mechanisms, behaviors, and concerns with users who are visually impaired. In this
section, we provide an overview of these works that inform our approach.

2.1

Browser Security Warnings Research

Akhawe and Felt performed the first large-scale field study of user decisions upon
encountering three types of browser security warnings in Google Chrome and Mozilla
Firefox: malware, phishing, and SSL warnings [2]. All three of these warnings are
full-page, interstitial warnings that caution the user against proceeding to the next
page. Both Chrome and Firefox display malware and phishing warnings when a
website is identified as unsafe by the Google Safe Browsing List. SSL warnings appear in the event of a man-in-the-middle attack, as well as benign scenarios, such
as server misconfigurations, since the browser often cannot distinguish between the
two. Although all three types of warnings have a potential for false positives, low
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click-through rates close to 0% were ideal, as this indicates that users observe and
heed the warnings. In order to measure click-through rate, i.e. the rate at which
users bypass a warning, Akhawe and Felt used the browsers’ telemetry frameworks
to collect pseudonymous data from users unobtrusively. Akhawe and Felt observed
that Mozilla Firefox users clicked through all three types of browser warnings at a
lower rate than Google Chrome users, and cited warning appearance as a possible,
but not sole explanation. For example, they noted that the SSL warning in Mozilla
Firefox displayed an image of a policeman and the word “untrusted” in the title—a
frightening design that may have lead to a lower click-through rate. In our study, we
focused on the same three types of browser security warnings and were also interested
in what factors might influence a user who is visually impaired to bypass a warning,
and how they might go about it. However, we were less interested in the rates at
which our participants bypassed a warning, but the steps in which the user would
need to take to either bypass or adhere to a warning using their assistive technologies,
in addition to the unique factors that would lead them to doing so.
There have also been studies examining the effectiveness of one type of browser security warning as they evolve in their design. When browsers evolved from using passive
phishing indicators to full-page interstitial phishing warnings that forced the user to
take notice, Egelman et al. performed an empirical study examining their effectiveness
[22]. The researchers recommended that an effective phishing warning design must interrupt the primary task, provide clear options on how to proceed, fail safely, prevent
habituation, and draw the user away from trusting the phishing website. These recommendations provide important context for our study, in which we interview users
who are visually impaired about their interaction with a phishing warning example.
It is unclear whether phishing warnings meet these recommendations when they are
accessed via assistive technologies, such as screen readers. Through semi-structured
task-based interviews, we sought to understand how visually impaired users process
6

the information in browser security warnings using their assistive technologies. We
believe this is an important step towards evaluating warning effectiveness with this
population and potentially identifying the elements of a universally effective warning
design.
Browser security warning effectiveness is also affected by a user’s trust in whether a
warning is genuine. Bravo et al. interviewed advanced and novice users about their
reactions to computer security warnings and observe that both novice and advanced
users made security judgments based on whether a warning appeared authentic [10],
aligning with other studies’ findings that the look and feel of a website is often the
most significant factor in gaining user trust [82, 25]. When one of the novice participants in their study was presented with an SSL certificate warning when accessing
a bank website, he said about the warning, “I guess the message looks authentic in
terms of just the design, the icon used, and the font and the text and the gradient for
the bar up top.” Novice users cited appearance as a reason to trust a warning, whereas
for advanced users, appearance was a reason not to trust a warning. It is unclear how
visually impaired users make security judgments when encountering warnings, for example, if and how they determine authenticity or trustworthiness. In our study, we
ask open-ended questions in our semi-structured interviews to gain insight about the
non-visual factors by which visually impaired users make security judgments, such
as authenticity and trustworthiness, and whether these factors are considered in the
decision to bypass or adhere to a warning.
Other studies on browser security warning effectiveness also provided guidance for our
research design. Sotirakopoulos et al. use an experimental study design to investigate
SSL warning effectiveness and learn about participants’ reactions to SSL warnings in
general [69]. The authors make important recommendations to consider regarding the
impact of the study environment when observing user behavior and reactions. Due
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to a number of the study participants reporting that they ignored a warning either
because they trusted the researchers to provide a safe environment to complete the
task, or simply because they wanted to complete the task, the authors suggest moving
away from laboratory studies towards field studies when the usable security research
is focused on user practices and behavior. This is because the lab environment may
provide the user with high conviction that it is a safe environment and would therefore
not always yield true reactions to the warning, even when the purpose of the study is
concealed. Studies taking place in a setting that is natural and not artificial can yield
more accurate findings. Given these recommendations, we decided not to simulate
real threats in a lab environment nor conceal the purpose of the study. Our study
design employs task-based interviews, not to test their true reaction to a warning,
but to ask the participants directly about their reactions and reasoning about their
reactions to an example of a warning, as Sotirakopoulos. We hypothesize that their
research design recommendations would be appropriate, if not crucial, in our study
with users who are visually impaired, given that there is potential for resentment or
embarrassment when the study design is not transparent to the participants.

2.2

Experiencing the Web via Screen Reader

There is a body of literature outlining the accessibility and usability issues that visually impaired users encounter while browsing the web, along with the navigation
strategies they employ with their assistive software in various contexts. Lazar et al.
found that one of the leading causes of frustration of 100 blind users was confusing
screen reader feedback due to the page layout [48]. Screen reader users develop their
favorite strategies for web browsing, based on their individual preferences or on the
task they are trying to accomplish [8]. Vigo and Harper identified seventeen strategies that screen reader users employ to overcome situations of uncertainty, reduced
8

mobility, confusion, and information overload, and we discuss a few of them below
[76]. While these studies explore navigation strategies in more common website scenarios such as online shopping, they provide a strong foundation for understanding
the possible interactions that might occur and mental models formed when visually
impaired users encounter browser security warnings.
Theofanos and Redish interview sixteen blind users as they navigated websites using
a screen reader and observed that just as sighted users do not read every word, most
blind users do not listen to every word on a web page. Instead, they “scan” a website
with their ears by listening at a high speed and rapidly explore the page by jumping
directly to headings and links through heading lists or link lists provided by the
screen reader [72]. These strategies are known as previewing or probing a web page
[76]. Similarly, Buzzi et al. examine how blind users interact with an e-commerce
website via screen reader and observed that they will often stop the screen reader at
the beginning of the page in favor of jumping to different portions of the page either
link by link using the tab key, or row by row using arrow keys [13]. Blind users will
often employ gambling scanning in this fashion until they encounter desired content,
and thereafter will navigate sequentially [76].
Takagi et al. investigate blind users’ behaviors while navigating online shopping
websites and found that blind users strongly rely on scanning for “landmarks”1 on a
page rather than logical navigation [71]. For example, the “add to cart” button on a
product page can be a landmark for efficiently accessing the product price, when the
user knows that the price element typically precedes the button [8]. Screen reader
users have also been found to remember the amount of content that needs to be
skipped to reach their desired content on websites that they frequent [76].
1

A landmark is an element or fragment of a page that can serve as a point of reference, such as
a link, button, or a main content area.
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It could be said that warning habituation, the tendency of a user to ignore a warning after having seen it and interacted with it multiple times [22], is a concern with
visually impaired users just as it is for sighted users. The navigation strategies that
blind users employ for accomplishing a task, including remembering landmarks and
jumping to desired sections of a web page, could lead the user to easily bypass a warning without accessing important information about the warning. However, contextindependent and self-explanatory links, content, and buttons on browser security
warnings can help with the loss of context that blind users face when probing a web
page [13].
The fact that blind users do not perceive the overall contents of a web page at
once may present challenges, but can also potentially have benefits when it comes
to browser security warnings. Sighted users can easily connect objects and text on a
page that are meant to be displayed in proximity, while blind users navigate linearly,
one line at a time and one word at a time [48]. Navigation through the page by
listening to content in a sequential fashion, a tactic known as exhaustive scanning
[76] could be frustrating on websites that are more complicated such as shopping or
banking websites. However, this navigation strategy could possibly be helpful if the
warning page has a well defined structure in which there is no confusion between
objects and neighboring text, and the user does not skip any important elements,
because all of the important warning information would be conveyed to the user. In
our study, we observe visually impaired users encounter examples of warnings to gain
clues to whether visually impaired users are more likely to adopt exhaustive scanning, gambling scanning, landmarks, or other strategies when encountering browser
security warnings and their possible implications for warning compliance.
The screen reader also narrates structural elements of the page alongside meaningful
content; for example, descriptions of elements such as decorative bullets may or may
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not add meaning while requiring additional cognitive effort to interpret. Images such
as icons and logos often have excessively lengthy descriptions which disrupt the flow
of information [27]. When navigating through site content and meta information,
visually impaired users have to split their cognitive energy in three ways between
interpreting the website contents, screen reader, and browser. Theofanos and Redish
describe the experience as akin to always being inside a help system in which the user
must pay attention to both their task as well as the system that is assisting them
[72]. This information overload often ends up being very time consuming, and in the
context of browser security warnings, it could be detrimental for warning compliance.
However, the structure of warning pages is typically simpler than other websites such
as online shopping websites, with only one or two links for proceeding to the next
page, or returning to safety, so it is not certain that information overload is an issue
that occurs when browser security warnings are interpreted via screen reader. Given
these unknowns, our study aims to gain insight into the issues that are present and
the navigation strategies employed when visually impaired users encounter browser
security warnings.
Vigo and Harper’s work challenging information foraging theory, which assumes that
user behavior on the web is driven by the need for foraging for information, found
that problematic situations can play a role in navigation strategies. In problematic
situations, screen reader users employ navigation tactics to escape from the situation,
rather than pursue their goal. For example, in scenarios of confusion or reduced
mobility, screen reader users were found to employ tactics of backtracking to a shelter2 ,
re-checking whether the link they clicked was a good choice, re-tracing the steps that
led to their problem, or giving up [75]. Encountering browser security warnings
could involve the use of some of these tactics, since browser security warnings cause
2

A shelter is a familiar web page that does not challenge the user or cause any problems.
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problematic situations such as confusion and stopping the user from their original
task. In our study, we leverage Vigo and Harper’s discovery of web navigation models
employed by screen reader users in problematic situations to better understand how
they might interact with browser security warnings.

2.3

Web Security and Privacy Research with Visually Impaired Users

There have been few studies investigating the privacy and security experiences of users
with visual impairments. Of those studies that have been conducted, most document
the most common security and privacy related concerns and challenges that visually
impaired users encounter on the web [37, 1, 39, 56], while others evaluate specific
security mechanisms or behaviors for users with visual disabilities, such as audiobased CAPTCHAs and other authentication experiences [21, 49]. In contrast, we
document visually impaired users’ experiences with browser warnings, of which there
are currently no studies. We have gleaned methodological approaches from these prior
works, especially the work focusing on documenting their experiences of interacting
with a specific security mechanism, and incorporate them into our study methods.
We discuss these approaches in the following sections.

2.3.1

Contextual Inquiry

Dosono et al. examine visually impaired users’ experiences with authentication mechanisms using a contextual inquiry approach, asking participants to perform a set of
five common authentication scenarios and encourage them to think aloud while completing the tasks. There are three main facets of contextual inquiry: (1) data is
collected in the context of the user performing real tasks, (2) the researcher and participant form a partnership for exploring issues together, and (3) the inquiry focuses
12

on a set of concerns with the flexibility of following promising directions [63]. This
enables researchers to form a complex picture of the participant’s in-the-moment
experience, including opinions and insight into their everyday experience with the
specific task. For example, while completing the task of logging into their email account, one participant voiced their frustration with locating the authentication area
and said “unfortunately, this is somethin’ that we run into a lot, is, you don’t know
what they call things, and every time they update the website, you have to re-learn
how to do it” [21]. In our study, we adopt contextual inquiry as a methodology in
order to focus on visually impaired users’ potential issues and concerns when navigating browser security warnings. Similarly, we conduct a task-based semi-structured
interview and ask participants to think aloud while navigating examples of browser
security warnings, while allowing room for further conversation about concerns and
issues.

2.3.2

Questionnaires

Contextual inquiry has often been used in conjunction with questionnaires. Napoli
et al. investigate visually impaired users’ real world privacy and security concerns
with three phases of data collection; a demographic pre-test, task-based observation,
and questionnaires with semi-structured interviews [56]. An initial questionnaire or
interview at the beginning of a study involving users with visual impairments helps
to inform the subsequent parts of the research protocol, as it can be used to identify
key demographic information about the participants, explore issues and concerns for
further investigation, and for informing the researcher of a participant’s technology
setup, including any preferences for assistive technology. Hayes et al. study how people with visual impairments work closely with allies in privacy and security contexts,
and include an initial interview asking participants to describe their daily life and
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demographics, as well as general experiences with the Internet and computers. The
visually impaired users’ allies provide additional information about the tasks that
they assist with in the initial interview [33]. Ahmed et al. employ a questionnaire
asking visually impaired users to provide background information, including their use
of assistive technologies and level of assistance needed in privacy and security contexts. The questionnaire is modified as needed when new concepts are identified from
early participants. For example, early participants in this study reported privacy
concerns about medical records, and a question about this was later added to the
questionnaire [1]. These studies demonstrate that questionnaires have been useful for
providing relevant background and context. Similarly, we ask participants to complete an initial questionnaire about their computer setup; specifically, the browser,
operating system, and assistive technologies that they typically use.
A questionnaire is also an avenue for screening potential participants based on variables of interest. At a minimum, Gerber advises organizing groups of blind or visually
impaired participants based on three factors: (1) “whether they use visual (i.e. screen
magnification) or non-visual means (i.e. screen readers) to access the web”, (2) level
of computer experience or use of the web, and (3) language and literacy [29]. In our
study questionnaire, we include questions regarding these three variables in order to
be informed and prepared.

2.3.3

Study Environment

Prior studies in this domain either involve participants in their natural environments
or provide specific computer setups. In a study of visually impaired users’ authentication experiences, Dosono et al. assess participants in the typical settings where
they regularly use their devices; e.g. their home, workplace, or public library. The
participants had the option of skipping any of the authentication tasks if they did
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not feel comfortable performing them. The researchers protected the study subjects’
privacy while recording video by turning the camera focus away when they entered
their credentials [21]. In their task-based observations of visually impaired users’ privacy behaviors, Napoli et al. offered participants two technological setups: a desktop
computer with JAWS and ZoomText, or an iPad with accessibility features, with the
option of using their own devices and tools such as a physical magnifying glass [56].
A predetermined setup runs the risk of the participant not being as familiar with the
provided tools as they would be with their own devices, and thus may not interact
the same way as they would normally. In our study, we ask participants to navigate
examples of browser security warnings with their own computer setup, so that they
are not limited to a predetermined setup and the concerns that go with them. We
offered to travel to participants’ homes or workplaces, ensuring their comfort with
either option. As Dosono, we ensure privacy by not capturing on video any sensitive
tasks, such as authentication. However, besides logging into their own computer,
participants did not need to use their own credentials for any of the tasks involved.
Previous studies that focus on visual elements in warnings have maintained ecological
validity due to the foundational work in conducting experiments in human-computer
interaction, which often rely on the visual representation of a user interface. For
example, Sunshine et al. include screenshots in an online survey to examine users’
perceptions of SSL warnings [70] and Almuhidemi et al. display screenshots in an
online survey with Amazon Mechanical Turk to investigate why users ignore malware
warnings [3]. This approach of distributing surveys online that display the image of a
warning is suitable with sighted users because viewing the image of a warning closely
matches the way in which the user would encounter the actual warning. However,
depending on the assistive technologies used, an image of a warning does not resemble
how screen reader users would encounter the warning. In contrast to previous studies,
we met subjects in person, in order to observe how a warning page, when rendered as
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HTML, was consumed via the specific assistive technologies that participants use on
a daily basis. We adopted an approach that we believe better simulates the warning
scenario with visually impaired users.
Gathering data in a natural setting in which visually impaired participants interact
with the warnings in their typical context is essential to this work. In a study of how
SSL warnings affect user behavior during tasks, Sunshine et al. ask participants to
interact with the warning on a laptop with a virtual machine provided in a laboratory
environment to ensure that the browser and operating system settings were exactly
the same [70]. This setup may be suitable for non-sighted users if the necessary assistive technology for the user is also provided. However, current assistive technologies
are expensive, and people with disabilities often have highly personalized computer
setups [32]. Users might utilize a combination of assistive technologies and switch
among them for different tasks. The assistive technology and the user’s level of proficiency can have a large impact on how the user interacts with a product [34]. In our
study, we conducted interviews in an environment that best matches that in which
participants experience warnings (and, thus avoiding inaccuracies in results due to
potential differences in computer setup, assistive technologies, and settings that a lab
computer might have). We traveled to the participant’s home or work environment
to observe their interaction with warnings using the browser, operating system, and
computer that typically use.
The vast variability in browser security warnings by browser also presents a challenge
in developing a research protocol that can be used with every participant consistently.
Warnings differ across browsers and browser versions, and the page layout of one type
of warning may not be the same as a different warning type in the same browser. For
example, the page hierarchy of the malware warning is different from the SSL warning
in the same browser in Internet Explorer 9+ and Safari. Furthermore, browsers do
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not have the same level of screen reader accessibility, as each browser has their own
Accessibility API that is queried by screen readers [51]. Internet Explorer 9+ includes
a feature called SmartScreen Filter that must be activated for certain warnings to be
available. In our study, we noted which warnings would be applicable to the user based
on the browser that they typically use, and prepared the tasks for the in-person taskbased interview accordingly. We developed a research protocol that anticipates the
potential variety of computer and assistive technology setup, and which also accounts
for the variability of warnings.
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Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY

3.1

Research Design

3.1.1

Generic Qualitative Inquiry

To understand visually impaired users’ experiences of interacting with web browser
security warnings, we adopted a generic qualitative approach. Qualitative research
is an investigative process with the intent of understanding a particular situation or
interaction, focusing on participants’ perceptions and experiences [19]. Percy et al.
describe a generic qualitative research approach that is used to explore people’s attitudes, opinions, and beliefs about a particular experience, and examines the content
of what participants report about their experiences. This generic approach differs
from a more focused, phenomenological qualitative inquiry that studies a participant’s cognitive processing and captures their psychological experience [60]. While
phenomenology explores the participant’s inward process during a task, a generic
approach investigates what occurred in the outer world [60]. We sought to discover
the opinions, attitudes, and beliefs towards browser security warnings through participants’ own reflections about their interactions with the warnings, and was less
focused on the structure of their inner experiences. This work was thus guided by
an open-ended, exploratory research question using a generic qualitative inquiry approach.
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Table 3.1: Website sources that represent an example of each warning
type, for each browser that the examples were identified for.
Browser
Warning Example Source URL
Phishing
Safari
IE 9+

http://phishing.safebrowsingtest.com/
None (same as Malware Warning)

Malware
Chrome http://malware.testing.google.test/testing/malware
IE 9+
http://malvertising.info
Safari,
http://itisatrap.org/firefox/its-an-attack.html
Firefox
SSL
Safari,
IE 9+

3.1.2

https://expired.badssl.com

Warning Types

We focus on three types of warnings, as did Akhawe and Felt in the first largescale field study of browser security warning effectiveness: phishing, malware, and
SSL warnings [2]. Browsers display a full page interstitial warning when the user
is attempting to visit a website that is found on a blacklist of reported phishing or
malware sites, or when there may be a problem with a website’s security certificate.
Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox check websites against the Google Safe Browsing
List, while Internet Explorer 9+ checks websites against the Microsoft SmartScreen
Filter for phishing and malware sites. At the time this study was conducted, Internet
Explorer 9+ browsers were showing the same warning for both phishing and malware
sites. Apple Safari, Google Chrome, and Mozilla Firefox had separate warnings for
each of the three types of warnings. For each type of warning, we identified a website
that served to represent an example of the warning, that users could navigate to and
interact with without any real security threat. See Table 3.1 for the website sources
of warnings that were used as examples for each type of warning and browser.
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3.2

Participant Recruitment

Our participant criteria aligns with Gerber’s three recommended screening variables
for research with blind and visually impaired users [29]. First, while we did not ask
participants to document their level of vision loss as Gerber suggests, we recruited
individuals who were considered to be “blind or visually impaired” by themselves and
their organization. We decided to focus on individuals who use a screen reader to
access the web non-visually, as The Disability Rights Commission has reported that
blind screen reader users encounter the most difficulties on the Web compared to
non-disabled users [17]. Second, we recruited individuals who had current access to
the internet on their own browser and computer, either at their home or work place.
Third, all potential participants were presumed to be English-speaking and literate.
From August 2015 through October 2015, we recruited potential participants by contacting and forming a relationship with service organizations throughout California
that provide resources to people who have visual disabilities, as well as the Accessibility team at a technology company. We also reached out to potential candidates
by utilizing a mailing list maintained by our university that includes individuals who
have visual disabilities, and by word of mouth.
The invitation to participate was an email message along with a link to a questionnaire for individuals who satisfied the participation criteria (Appendix A). The
questionnaire includes questions regarding demographics, computer profile, and web
security perceptions. At the end of the questionnaire, the respondent was asked to
provide their preferred method of contact and contact information if they agreed to
participate in an in-person interview.
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We arranged in-person interviews with interested respondents on a rolling basis. Prior
to the interview, we requested that the participant have access to a computer and
screen reader they frequently use, and the address of their preferred meeting location. We offered to travel to their preferred location. We did not provide monetary
incentives.

3.3

Data Collection

Our study underwent a full review process and was approved by our University’s
Institutional Review Board (IRB). As did similar studies [1, 56, 21], our data collection
consisted of multiple phases. The first was an electronic questionnaire delivered to
potential participants upon receiving electronic informed consent, and the second was
a task-based contextual interview with each individual who chose to participate. We
were prepared for the in-person interview by using a questionnaire, by becoming aware
of the computer setup and warning types that were applicable to the participant, as
well as any additional questions or comments that the participant wanted to discuss.
The full research protocol and artifacts can be found in Appendices A, B, and C.

3.3.1

Phase 1: Questionnaire

The questionnaire was hosted on the Section 508-compliant website SurveyMonkey,
which ensures user-friendliness with screen readers. Section 508 is a United States
federal law that requires that Federal agencies’ electronic and information technology
is accessible to people with disabilities. The University Human Subjects Committee
reviewed and approved our informed consent form (See Appendix B.1). The informed
consent document on the first page of the questionnaire disclosed the purpose and
procedure of the study, reported minimal risk to the participant, cited potential ben21

efits, and provided the option to exit the questionnaire or continue to the questions.
These elements of the informed consent were in accordance with non-deceptive user
research [18]. This study did not pose any real threats to users’ data since participants did not have to install new software or undergo an attack to navigate to
canonical warnings in their browser. We noted in the informed consent form as well
as the in-person interview the potential benefits for participants. Benefits included an
increased understanding of how accessible and usable browser security warnings are
via screen reader, which can lead to potential improvements to the design of browser
security warnings in the future. At the expense of ecological validity, we opted for full
disclosure to be able to have an open discussion with participants about the warnings.
The questionnaire asked respondents what browser, operating system, and screen
reader they typically use. Also included were questions about demographics, screen
reader proficiency and customization, and perceptions of web security. These questions and options were drawn from the Web Accessibility In Mind (WebAIM) Screen
Reader User Survey, an annual survey of screen reader user preferences [40]. Lastly,
the questionnaire includes a field for the preferred method of contact for the respondent to indicate whether they would agree to participate in an in-person interview.
The informed consent form helped us to prepare for the follow up interview. See
Appendix B for our informed consent form and the complete list of questions.

3.3.2

Phase 2: Contextual Inquiry

To recreate the user’s working conditions for the in person task-based interview,
we adopted a contextual inquiry approach to qualitative research, a research design
commonly used to learn what is important to users in the context of their own environment [64]. The interviews were conducted in a natural setting, as is common
with qualitative data collection techniques employed in inclusive privacy and security
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research, in order to focus on participants’ experiences in their typical work or home
settings where they regularly use their devices [19].
For each of the three warning types, we leveraged existing websites that served to
represent an example of the warning in a specific browser. By accessing an example
of a warning, the user could navigate to and interact with a warning without the
website posing any real risk to the user. Table 3.1 lists the website source URLs of
the examples for each warning type and browser that was tested.
See Appendix E for screenshots of the example warning pages or popup that participants interacted with. We set up an appointment with each participant and traveled
to their preferred location for the in-person interview. All of the participants in
this study preferred to conduct the interview at their home. We began the in-person
contextual interview by disclosing the purpose of the study, and reminding the participant that they may choose to end the study at any time, for any reason. Participants
were tasked with navigating to each warning type that was available as a canonical
example in the browser that they use. These tasks were chosen to minimize the task
duration and necessary steps, while also covering the applicable types of warnings
available from the browser, in a way that would also pose no real danger to the participant. A full chronological description of events that occurred during the in-person
interview is included in Appendix C.2.
Potential power imbalances that are present in any user research study deserve extra
attention in studies with participants who have visual impairments. We encouraged
the participant to think aloud about what they were doing and their reasoning in
reaction to a warning, acknowledging the participant as the “master” and ourselves as
the “apprentice.” We communicated our understanding of what participants reported
back to the participant throughout the interview, in order to check for the accuracy
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of our immediate interpretations. This ensured that the participant was playing an
active role in the research findings, as is best practice [18].
Our semi-structured interview approach leveraged a series of open-ended questions
to ask about the participant’s reaction, whether they have encountered the warning
before, the steps that are necessary to bypass a warning or return to the previous
page, and whether the participant had suggestions for improving these interactions or
the available information on the warning page. We took notes during the in-person
meeting labeled with a unique ID number assigned to the participant. We asked
for and were granted permission to capture each participant’s computer screen and
keyboard during the interview, in order to document what was happening on the
computer screen in case there was a mismatch with the participant’s experience of
the warning. Interviewing and observing participants navigating one warning type
took approximately 10 minutes, making each session with a participant approximately
10 to 30 minutes depending on the warning types available to be tested.

3.3.2.1

Phishing Warning Scenario

In the phishing warning scenario, participants were asked to view an example of a
phishing e-mail, by logging into an e-mail account with credentials provided, that
contained one single unread e-mail. The contents of the phishing email were sourced
from an example of a common phishing email provided by Cornell University’s Phish
Bowl website, a repository of common phishing emails targeting Cornell University
students and staff [74]. The participant was informed that the phishing email example
demonstrates a common phishing scenario that would lead to the browser’s phishing
warning page, if detected. The phishing warning scenario was not conducted for
Internet Explorer users because at the time of this study, there was not a separate
phishing warning from the malware warning in Internet Explorer.
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3.3.2.2

Malware Warning Scenario

To minimize task duration, participants were asked to navigate directly to the example
of a malware warning. We instructed the participant to navigate to the website by
reading the URL aloud to the participant.

3.3.2.3

SSL Warning Scenario

To minimize task duration, participants were asked to navigate directly to the example
of an SSL warning. We instructed the participant to navigate to the website by
reading the URL aloud to the participant. In Safari, an SSL warning pop up instead
of a web page is displayed. For participants using Safari, navigating to the example
SSL warning page triggered the SSL warning popup to appear in Safari and interrupt
the user.

3.4

Ethical Considerations

Security warning research carries risks of psychological and emotional distress, which
can be compounded for users with disabilities. The Nielsen Norman Group reports
that the web is three times easier for sighted users than for users who are blind or
visually impaired [44, 58]. On the electronic informed consent form, we assured potential participants that if they chose to participate they may end the study at any
time, for any reason. For those who chose to participate, we reminded the participant of this in-person. We included our University’s Health and Wellbeing Center’s
phone number on the informed consent form, and our contact information was also
made available to non-students as an emotional support resource in accordance with
our University IRB requirements. We developed the research protocol to minimize
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task duration and steps to avoid undue stress or confusion, while ensuring that each
action was possible for the user with their particular computer set up and assistive
technology.
During the in-person contextual interviews, we asked for permission to make any
changes in the environment: permission was requested and granted in every session
to displace or place objects such as extra lighting, for a higher volume of sound on
the computer speakers, for us to grab an extra chair and sit in it, start a video
recording with audio, place a video camera in a described location, and include only
the participant’s computer screen and keyboard in the video recording. During each
step of the interview, participants were made aware of where the camera was placed
and what was being captured in the video frame, as suggested by Henry [34]. We also
alerted the participant to any unusual noises from her activities, including starting,
pausing, or stopping a video recording. Interactions with service animals in the
vicinity were avoided, as suggested by Henry [34].
During all stages of the research, we took measures to ensure that participants’ privacy was protected. We used pseudonymous identifiers in our study to protect participants’ personal data to ensure that any personally identifiable information that
was collected would be kept confidential and discarded when appropriate. It is normative for researchers to protect a participant’s anonymity by associating their data
with a numerical study code that can uniquely identify participants without the use
of their name [18]. Every questionnaire response was assigned a unique number (01
through 16). We maintained a mapping of these numerical pseudonymous identifiers to the interview participant’s first name, without contact information. The only
link between a participant’s name and contact information was stored as responses
in SurveyMonkey and in e-mails with participants, which could only be accessed by
us. The pseudonymous identifier was used in place of any identifying information for
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all remaining stages of the study, including taking notes, labeling video recordings,
labeling video transcriptions, performing data analysis, and reporting results. Any
non-identifying response data was labeled with the pseudonymous identifier.

3.5

Thematic Analysis

We began analysis of each session by transcribing each video recording to text, and
developed an open qualitative coding scheme. Quotations from participants, selected
from video transcripts, were labeled with the participant study ID number and assigned study codes. Quotations were then categorized into high level themes. This
produced a set of common themes when compared across all participants for which
the warning type was applicable, revealing a summary of key findings. Experiences
that were specific to participants’ computer set up or internet browsing behaviors
were also documented.
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Chapter 4
RESULTS

4.1

Participants

Of the sixteen subjects who responded to our questionnaire, eight individuals agreed
to an in-person interview. This small sample size comes close to that of similar
studies investigating visually impaired users’ security experiences that involved 10-15
participants [21, 55]. All respondents considered themselves to have a level of visual
impairment. See Tables D.1, D.2, D.3 for the complete set of questionnaire response
data.

4.1.1

Demographics

Table 4.1: Participant demographics and computer profile response data
from questionnaire respondents who participated in a follow-up interview.
Browser represents the browser that the respondent indicated was the
browser that they use when using their primary screen reader.
ID Sex Age
OS Screen Reader Browser
U01
U04
U07
U08
U09
U10
U11
U12

F 35 to 44
M 55 to 64
M 45 to 54
M 25 to 34
M 35 to 44
M 18 to 24
M 45 to 54
F 45 to 54

Windows
Windows
Mac
Mac
Windows
Windows
Windows
Windows

JAWS
Windows-Eyes
VoiceOver
NaturalReader
JAWS
Windows-Eyes
JAWS
JAWS

IE 9+
IE 8
Safari
Safari
IE 9+
IE 9+
Firefox
IE 9+

Table 4.1 includes participant demographics and computer profile data from questionnaire respondents who also participated in the follow up interview. The group of
eight individuals consisted of two females and six males. All but two participants used
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Microsoft Windows as their operating system. Two participants used Windows-Eyes
as their screen reader during the interview tasks, four participants used JAWS, and
one participant used VoiceOver. One participant, U08, indicated NaturalReader as
their screen reader, but did not use a screen reader during the follow-up interview.
Four participants indicated Internet Explorer 9+ as the browser that they use when
using their primary screen reader, two participants indicated Safari, one indicated
Internet Explorer 8, and one indicated Firefox. U11, who indicated Firefox as the
browser that they use when using their primary screen reader, chose to use Internet
Explorer during the interview tasks. Researchers should note that the response data
regarding primary computer profile may not reflect what the participant chooses to
use during an in-person interview, and prepare accordingly, if the interview tasks are
dependent on those factors.
We compared the browser, operating system, and screen reader used by our sample of
study participants to the most commonly used computer setups indicated by respondents of a screen reader survey conducted in 2015 by WebAIM, in which the majority
of the 2515 respondents were blind or low vision/visually impaired (64% and 38.7%
respectively) [40]. The WebAIM Screen Reader User Survey found Windows to be
the most common operating system, Internet Explorer to be the most commonly used
browser, and JAWS to be the most commonly used screen reader among respondents,
as is the case in our sample of study participants.

4.2

4.2.1

Warning Scenarios

Obstacles to Completion of Warning Scenarios

None of the eight participants completed all three types of warning scenarios. Table
4.2 charts the warning scenarios that were completed by each participant. The six
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Table 4.2: Warning scenarios that were successfully completed (“C”), or
not completed, (“N”) by each participant during the in-person interview,
by warning type. “N” indicates that the user did not complete the warning
scenario due to an obstacle. At the time this study was conducted, there
was not a separate phishing warning from the malware warning in Internet
Explorer 9+.
ID Browser Used Phishing
Malware SSL
U07
U08

Safari
Safari

ID

Browser Used

U01
U04
U09
U10
U11
U12

C
N

N
C

Phishing/Malware

IE 9+ C
IE 8 N
IE 9+ N
IE 9+ C
IE 9+ C
IE 9+ C

C
C

SSL
C
C
C
C
C
C

participants who used Internet Explorer during the in-person interview did not participate in a separate phishing warning scenario because Internet Explorer displays a
malware warning for websites that are suspected of both phishing and malware, and
does not display a phishing-specific warning. Otherwise, warning scenarios were not
completed when the warning example webpage could not be accessed at the time of
the interview for various reasons. For example, U08 did not participate in a phishing
warning scenario because the example phishing warning website did not display its
usual contents at the time on Safari, and instead displayed a Google Sites website
skeleton. This was a temporary occurrence, as the same example phishing warning
website loaded its usual contents, displaying an example of a Safari phishing warning,
for the interview with U07. Due to this issue, U07 was the only participant who
completed a phishing warning scenario.
U04 and U09, both using Internet Explorer, were not able to participate in the malware warning scenario because the example warning website hosted by Malvertising.info did not load at the time, due to the website being down. The same example
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malware warning website was available for the four other interviews using Internet
Explorer. U07 did not participate in a malware warning scenario, as the example
malware warning page hosted by Google did not load in his Apple Safari browser at
the time of the interview (despite having tested the Google hosted website prior to the
interview). After the interview with U07, we found that another example malware
warning hosted by Mozilla was available, and was later used in an interview with
U08, the other participant who used Safari.
All eight participants completed the SSL warning scenario without any obstacle as
the same source URL for the example SSL warning was compatible with all browsers.
See Appendix E for screenshots of each of the warnings that participants interacted
with.

4.3

4.3.1

Common Themes

Initial Reaction to a Warning

At the expense of ecological validity, we fully disclosed the purpose of the study and
asked participants to navigate to an example of a warning and think aloud about
the steps that they would take. In this approach, the scenarios did not pose any real
threat to the user and minimized duration of the tasks involved. Because the warnings
did not occur in a real world context in which users are blocked in their attempt to
access a certain website, and instead are navigating directly to a warning, their initial
reaction to the warning from the interview task may not be representative of what
their reaction would be if they encountered a warning organically. Our approach in
asking the participant what they would have done if they encountered the warning,
however, provided insight into what factors would influence their reaction in a real
world context.
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For each warning, the first question in our semi-structured interview format inquired
about participants’ initial reaction to that warning. Our interviews indicated that
the reaction is often dependent on the user’s familiarity with the website they are
trying to visit or whether they have visited it before. In six of the fourteen total
warning scenarios, the users communicated that their familiarity with a website was
a reason to ignore a warning. In the malware warning scenario, U01 (mistakenly)
expressed her belief that certificate errors were a common occurrence, and stated
that if a website was familiar, she would ignore the warning: “I get a lot of certificate
errors and things like that. To tell you the truth, usually I just ignore stuff like this
because if I know the website that I’m going to, I know a lot of the smaller websites
and things like that have trouble paying to keep up with their certificates and stuff so
this kind of stuff I just say whatever.” U01 reacted to the malware warning based
on her recollection of SSL warnings. U01 expressed the same sentiment with regards
to the SSL warning scenario, although the SSL warning was more familiar: “This
I’ve seen before, many many times. And again I’d look for some way to skip past
this, because I’ve noticed a lot of smaller websites have trouble keeping up with this.”
Although the SSL and malware warnings were two different types of warnings, with
only the SSL warning type encompassing the certificate warnings that she had seen
previously, U01 was inclined to ignore both of them.
Similarly, when evaluating the malware warning example, U08 expressed that familiarity with the website he was trying to visit would lead him to ignore the warning,
while he would heed the warning in the case of visiting a website from a search result: “If I was familiar with the site and knew that it was a safe site...I’d ignore the
warning. If I was googling for a new pair of shoes or something, then I would follow
the warning.”
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When discussing his reaction to an SSL warning example, U04 stated that he would
read more details or proceed through to a website, ignoring a warning, based on
whether he had visited the website previously: “If it was something that...I had been
to before, that I had a pretty good idea was okay, I would probably either read the
information or just go to the website if it was a website that I trusted.” U07 expressed
that an SSL warning is likely to be superfluous in cases when he had knowledge of
the website he was trying to visit: “It’s probably okay...especially because I probably
knew the website that I was going to, that it’s just some over-excessive Safari security
precaution. I would just go to the continue button...because I probably knew something
about this page before going there.” Similarly, U11 expressed no cause for concern
when confronted with an SSL warning, especially if the website was a familiar one:
“I don’t think much of an expired certificate, it doesn’t worry me when I’m trying to
go to some place I know.”
Six out of eight interviewees were able to complete two warning scenarios. All but one
user who participated in two warning scenarios reacted differently to each scenario.
In both the malware and SSL warning examples, U12 expressed the inclination to
heed both warnings and return to safety.
In reaction to both the malware warning and SSL warning scenario, U01 stated that
she would typically bypass the warning. Although the first warning scenario that
U01 completed was a malware warning, and not an SSL warning, she mentioned that
she would “get a lot of certificate errors and things like that” and chose to bypass
the malware warning for that reason. When she encountered the SSL warning, she
stated, “Again I’d look for some way to skip past this, I’ve noticed a lot of smaller
websites have trouble keeping up with this...I’m arrowing down to look for some way
to bypass it.”
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U07 was the only participant to complete the phishing warning scenario. He completed the SSL warning scenario as well, and reacted differently to each. He expressed
that the SSL warning example was a non-concern, especially in the case of visiting
a website that he was familiar with. In contrast, he stated that he would heed a
phishing warning, and avoid interacting with the page for safety reasons: “When it
says suspected phishing site, I probably would just close it, just so I don’t have to deal
with it...I wouldn’t wanna click on the link that says learn more, because the more you
click, the more you take a chance of infecting your computer.”
U08 reacted differently to the malware and SSL warning scenario. While he stated
that he would ignore the malware warning if he was visiting a website he was familiar
with, the text content of the SSL warning page was found to more likely promote compliance: “The wording is more compelling, it makes the website sound more harmful,
makes the website sound more malicious.”
In reaction to both the malware and SSL warning scenarios, U10 expressed an inclination to heed the warning. In reaction to the malware warning example, he quickly
stated that “My first reaction is I should probably leave the website”. However, in
the SSL warning scenario, he elaborated that he would ignore the warning in certain
cases, “It’s probably not safe to go to this website, but if I really need to slash want
to, I’d probably go to it anyways...if I was doing research or something like that, I
think I would ”. Depending on the task that he was trying to complete, he felt that
he would bypass a warning, despite his first reaction to heed the warning.
In reaction to the malware warning example, U11 described the keyboard action that
he would take to return to safety: “First reaction would be hit the ALT HOME and
go back to the Google search.” In response to the SSL warning scenario, U11 recalled
a time that he had seen the warning before and had the ability to bypass the warning:
“Sometimes I’ve been able to go through it, I don’t remember how I did it...I somehow
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managed to get to and I can’t remember how, it’s been a long time.” He proceeded to
use the arrow keys to search for the link to bypass the warning: “OK, so I’m gonna
first go over to the page and gonna just ARROW down. I’m looking for links...and
then I would hit the space bar, and then I would get to where I was trying to get to.”

4.3.2

Phrasing and Terminology in Warnings

The phrasing and terminology used in the textual elements in warnings are a common
theme among participants; half of the participants commented, or made a suggestion,
on how a warning message or call to action could be conveyed. During the malware
warning scenario, U01 noted that the warnings that she had encountered in the past
have had alternate terminology to describe actions for bypassing or ignoring a warning, and suggested more uniformity: “Sometimes it’s skip, sometimes it’s don’t warn
me about this in the future. There should be some kind of uniform message...phrasing
should be similar.” This uniformity in phrasing may help screen reader users quickly
locate the button or link to bypass a warning: “I think at least something specific
to look for, hey, if I come across this kind of security warning, how do I get past
it. What’s the phrasing I’m looking for. Because this kind of stuff really does kinda
frustrate people...they don’t know how to get past it.” The idea that a warning should
contain phrasing that users can become familiar with and search for was also suggested during her SSL warning scenario: “I mean continue to website is fine, but then
they have to know with all of these pages to look for that language. So if I know every
time to ‘continue on to website’...great.” Because screen reader users often navigate
a page by iterating through heading levels and links and listening to the start of each
line, a standard set of phrases to indicate the available courses of action may help to
identify them more efficiently.
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The phrasing of the bypass option could contain clarification of the destination that
the button or link would lead the user to. During the phishing warning scenario in
Apple Safari, the options available on the phishing warning example page were to
“Learn more,” “Ignore Warning,” “Go Back,” and “Report an error.” U07 suggested
that the “Ignore Warning” button could further specify the result of clicking the
button with the words, “Ignore warning and proceed to page.” He also wondered
about the effect of the “Report an error” button, and the entity that was producing
the warning message that would receive the error report: “I am trying to think of
what ‘report error’ would mean. The more things you click, the more trouble you
may get into. Report an error to whom? Where is this error coming from? ” His
comments reveal a sense of caution when faced with the phishing warning message,
and suggest that buttons and links that contain specific words indicating what the
result of clicking on them would be, would provide more confidence for the user to
click on them.
U07’s suggestion for more specific phrasing of where a button or link would take the
user to coincides with the confusion that several participants using Internet Explorer
experienced in the SSL warning scenario. During the SSL warning scenario U12
was presented with the options “Click here to close the webpage,” “Continue to this
website (not recommended),” and “More information.” U12 inquired aloud about
whether the link to close the webpage would lead her to her browser’s home page or
her previously visited page: “The only thing that I would wonder is where am I gonna
go, like am I gonna go back to my blank screen, where I start from, my home page, or
am I gonna go back to where I came from, in other words, if I had been surfing around
Google, and got here, would I go back to Google, would I go back to my home page,
where would I go? ” Similarly, when U10 and U11 navigated to the option to close the
webpage in the same SSL warning scenario, they were uncertain of what the result
would be. When prompted to “do what he would normally do” when he encountered
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the warning, U10 said: “I’m just gonna close it down and see what happens.” U11
also voiced the same sense of discovery when considering what the effect would be of
clicking on the option: “Click here to close this webpage, I’m not sure what it’ll do,
let’s find out! ” Among several participants using Internet Explorer to navigate the
SSL warning example, there was a theme of uncertainty of where the option would
lead the user to.
In the malware warning scenario, U08 had the same idea that U07 had in the phishing
warning scenario, of using the word “proceed” to indicate that bypassing a warning
would lead a user to the page that they were trying to visit: “Something that bothers
me, is what it says on the buttons, it says ignore warning or go back. How would I
rephrase that, I would probably just use different wording, like proceed.” Similarly, in
the SSL warning scenario, U01 suggested using language that provides direction to the
user: “Continue on to website, bypass this message, ignore this message. Something
that very clearly gives the next step as to where to go from here.”
Several users commented on the phrasing in a warning message being an indicator of
the severity of danger. U08, who used Apple Safari, felt that the SSL warning message
indicated more danger than the malware warning message: “This warning message is
more compelling to, make it sound more harmful...the wording of the message is more
compelling, it makes it sound more malicious, as opposed to the previous message.
I’d be more likely to follow its advice.” U07, on the other hand, who also used Apple
Safari, felt the opposite way about the same SSL warning: “If it was an expired
security SSL certificate, that’s not as ominous sounding as a phishing scam or some
other message. It doesn’t sound like it’s gonna screw up my computer.” Similarly,
U10, who used Internet Explorer, pointed out that the SSL warning message used
words that were less definitive than the malware warning message, and therefore
yielded less caution. U10 noticed that the malware warning declared that the website
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that he would be trying to visit “is unsafe,” while the SSL warning stated that the
website “could be unsafe”: “I guess the keyword for me on this one is that it says
‘unsafe’, the other one says ‘could be unsafe,’ so I’m more willing to push the envelope
on ‘could be unsafe’ than ‘is unsafe.’ ”

4.3.3

Common Screen Reader Shortcuts

During the interviews, we asked participants to demonstrate how they would return
to the previous page or continue to the next page, if their initial reaction to the
warning did not consist of those interactions. Several of the participants used the
same method to return to the previous page. Windows users U04, U09, U11, and
U12 all reported that they would use the JAWS hotkeys ALT+LEFT ARROW in
order to return to the website that they came from. Two participants mentioned using
their screen reader’s shortcut for accessing buttons or links on a web page in order
to locate the bypass option. After discovering that the option to bypass the malware
warning was not available, U01 suggested adding a button to the warning that would
allow users to bypass the warning that would be accessed through the screen reader
using the “B” key: “I would put a button. With JAWS at least, pressing B for button
will take you to every single button on the page.” When U11 was asked during the
malware warning scenario what he would do to bypass the warning, U11 mentioned an
alternative JAWS screen reader shortcut that accesses the links on the page, instead
of the buttons: “I’m going to Insert F7 to get to the links.”

4.3.4

Seeking More Information

Several of the participants commented aloud on whether or not they would read the
additional information provided by the “More information” or “Learn more” option
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(depending on the warning type). All warning scenarios but one, the SSL warning
on Apple Safari, displayed this option on the web page rather than a dialogue box.
When prompted to “do what you would normally do” when encountering the SSL
warning, U04, U08, and U09 opted to read the additional information about the SSL
warning, by choosing the option on the web page. U12, on the other hand, distinctly
expressed that she was not interested in the option: “The chances of me choosing
more information are slim, because I don’t really care.” The only participant who
completed a phishing warning scenario, U07, also reported that he would not click on
the “Learn More” option, “because the more you click, the more you take a chance of
infecting your computer.”

4.3.5

Checking the Browser Toolbar

Two of the participants, who both used Internet Explorer, reported recollection of
encountering warnings in the browser’s toolbar. Upon encountering the SSL warning
example, U09 noted that he would immediately consult the notification bar in the
browser for options: “First of all I would see if there’s anything in the notification
bar that I need to be aware of, and I’m looking to see if there’s any buttons that I
need to be aware of. There have been some instances where I’ve seen the action to be
taken on the notification bar.” U09 proceeded to navigate to the browser’s toolbar
using his keyboard, and listened to the screen reader announce the contents of the
elements, including the address bar as well as the browser icons for accessing homepage, favorites, and settings. Upon encountering the malware warning example, U12
also recalled warnings that she had encountered previously with options in Internet
Explorer’s information bar: “Most of the warnings that I have seen have come through
the information bar, where you have to...go up to the information bar and it gives you
choices like open this site, or don’t, or whatever.”
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4.3.6

Trust in Antivirus Software

For two participants who used Internet Explorer, their trust in their antivirus software
helped them feel safe in ignoring the SSL warning. When asked to “do what he
would normally do” if he encountered the warning, U04 communicated his trust in
the Microsoft Windows antivirus software: “I’m going on to the website because I trust
Microsoft Security Essentials and...whatever the anti-malware stuff is in Windows 8.”
U09 expressed a similar sentiment: “Trusting that I have my malware and antivirus
stuff up-to-date, then I’ll just continue on to the site...usually you trust your antivirus
software will detect anything malicious.”

4.4

Screen Reader Interactions

While most participants listened to the screen reader narrate the contents of the
entire warning page upon encountering the warning, others (U01 and U11) stopped
the screen reader narration at the start of the web page. U01 employed a probing
browsing strategy to quickly navigate through the page to search for a method to
bypass the warning, skipping blank lines and headings when the first few words did
not match what she was looking for. U11, on the other hand, immediately used
ALT+HOME keyboard shortcut to return to his homepage.
For two participants using Internet Explorer, U11 and U12, the screen reader narrated a warning message that was not displayed on the warning web page contents:
“Reported unsafe website, navigation blocked.” U12 reported that she had never heard
this warning message from the browser before. The screen reader repeated this message three times in succession without any keyboard actions from the user, and then
reported the number of headings and links on the web page: “Page has six headings
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and three links.” We later discovered that this was the title of the web page. U11
opted not to listen to the actual contents of the web page, while U12 listened to the
screen reader narrate the entirety of the contents.
Five out of the seven participants who used a screen reader to navigate the warnings,
used either the DOWN arrow or TAB key on their keyboard to iterate through each
of the available options on the page before deciding their action. Two participants
did not iterate through the options, and instead opted to return to their previous
page using a keyboard shortcut.
We also observed different speeds of screen reader narration. U10’s Windows-Eyes
screen reader narrated the contents of the warnings at a significantly more rapid rate
than the other participants’ screen readers, while U12’s JAWS screen reader narrated
at a slower rate than the average.
In contrast to Apple Safari warnings which did not display any iconography, Internet
Explorer warnings included an icon alongside both warnings’ main heading, in addition to each of the available options, which were narrated by the screen reader. For
example, the screen reader narrates aloud, “Graphic recommended icon” followed by
the recommended option. When encountering this, U12 thought aloud, “I guess it’s
just a graphic with alt text, nothing to activate.”
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Chapter 5
DISCUSSION

5.1

Reflection of Methodology

As is common with human subjects research, a number of unforeseen circumstances
arose during our pilot study that can be addressed in future work. In this section,
we examine methodological choices that we made and the resulting trade-offs and
obstacles or unexpected scenarios that occurred.

5.1.1

Reliability of Warning Example Pages

One methodological challenge inherent in this type of research is creating warning
scenarios that accurately and reliably display the correct browser security warning
page to participants, according to the version of browser that they use. While we were
able to identify websites that serve this purpose, it forced us to be reliant on external
websites being available at the time of the interview. In some instances, the example
warning websites were not reliable, and for one of them we were able to identify
an alternative mid-study (See Chapter 4.2.1). While reliance on external websites
to provide example warnings caused site reliability issues that we needed to work
around, these warning websites proved to be authentic and reflected exactly what
the participant would have encountered. In future work, researchers can consider
hosting their own warning websites or backups on a reliable server; however while
this solves the availability issue, this approach gives rise to the challenge of creating
example websites that continuously support ever-changing browsers. There is not a
simple solution to striking the right balance between creating an authentic warning
42

scenario for the participant to interact with, without leveraging the external websites
that are meant to serve this purpose, but may not always be reliable for an in-person
interview.

5.1.2

Phishing Warning Scenario Privacy Concerns

The phishing warning scenario highlights another challenge of creating an authentic
scenario, without creating other risks. As described in Chapter 3.3.2, we tasked the
participant with navigating to Gmail to sign in to a provided email account with
given credentials, in order to demonstrate to the participant a typical phishing email,
which would lead to an example of a phishing warning. We did not consider that
the participant may already be signed into an existing Gmail account, as U07 was,
potentially revealing private email to the researcher. In addition to privacy, there are
also time, convenience, and complexity considerations (e.g. will the subject want to
sign out, will they be able to sign in again, etc.). When U07 navigated to Gmail by
our instruction, an existing, yet empty, email inbox was displayed. U07 proceeded to
search for options on the web page for signing out. While we intended to design the
website tasks to minimize task duration and unnecessary frustrations, U07 ended up
spending a few minutes to figure out how to sign out of their Gmail account.
One potential solution is to ask participants to perform these tasks in an incognito
window, which provides a blank slate for the user, solving the privacy issue and prevents the inconvenience of needing to sign out of their account and sign back in.
However, asking the user to use an incognito window may be inconsistent with users’
typical working environment and may have the potential of providing the participant
with a greater sense of security and influencing their authentic reaction to the warnings, in a scenario that has ecological validity already compromised by having users
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navigate directly to the warning. Here again, researchers must be cognizant of the
trade-offs inherent in studies of this kind.

5.1.3

Minimum Allowable Sized Window

It is common for blind or visually impaired users to navigate websites solely through
their keyboard. However, we did not expect that U01’s browser window would be
sized to the minimum as allowed by the operating system, occluding nearly all visual
content. As a result, we were not able to view what was being navigated on the web
page during the interview, nor were we able to record on video what was occurring on
the page. However, this did not interfere with the interview tasks. In order to avoid
additional tasks for the participant, we did not instruct the participant to expand
their browser window size. We were able to collect data and have a discussion with
the participant regarding all of the interview tasks involved, and deemed that it was
not necessary to modify the users’ original browser window size setting.
From this one unexpected occurrence, we found that the video recording was helpful
insofar as playing back the audio for transcribing conversations with the participant
and hearing the screen reader. It was not particularly useful for us to view what
was being shown on the participant’s computer screen. In fact, this one circumstance
proved the benefit of relying solely on audio to understand the user’s experience in
this research. Capturing only the audio reflects exactly what is experienced by the
user, and nothing more.

5.1.4

Ongoing Modifications to Methodology

This study benefited from slight modifications to the task-based interviews while the
interviews were being conducted on a rolling basis. For instance, the example malware
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warning page source URL was changed to one hosted by Mozilla upon discovery
that the original example page hosted by Google was no longer available mid-study,
allowing for subsequent Apple Safari interview participants to navigate to a warning
page that was available.
Another example of a mid-study modification to our task-based interviews was a
slight change in the instruction to participants to proceed with “what they would
normally do” if they encountered the warning while browsing the Web. For the
purpose of minimizing duration of tasks, but at the expense of ecological validity,
we asked participants to navigate directly to the examples of warning pages. This
artificial environment in which users navigate directly to a warning, instead of being
interrupted with a warning while browsing, often led to confusion and hesitation to
proceed with their natural action.
For example, during the SSL warning scenario, U01 was instructed to “do what she
would normally do” in the case that she encountered the SSL warning, and used the
ARROW key to locate the option on the page. She then inquired aloud: “That’s
what I’d normally do, is continue to this website. So, do you want me to continue,
or do you want me just to...? ” U01 was uncertain of whether to continue to the next
page, or stay on the current page after locating the option. We responded that she
did not need to proceed, as we were able to collect data on the steps she needed to
take to find the option to proceed.
Similarly, during the phishing warning scenario, U07 iterated through the available
options with his keyboard when asked to “do what he would normally do” upon
encountering the warning. When he concluded that his natural action would be to
return to the previous page, he indicated hesitation to do so: “I’d probably just click
go back. Do you want me to do that or click on the other buttons? ” The hesitation to
either return to the previous page, or continue to the next page, seemed to be due to
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the artificial nature of the study environment. After noticing this hesitation from U01
and U07, we mitigated this in subsequent interviews by providing clear instructions
to the user to “do what she would normally do”, while specifying to do so without
actually clicking on the button. This instruction to refrain from following through
with their decided action allowed for continued discussion while the user remained on
the warning example page, without burdening the user with any extra steps.

5.1.5

Analysis of Screen Reader Interactions

Conducting interviews and analyzing participants’ screen reader interactions requires
that the researcher possesses at least a basic competency with screen readers and
their output. This is an important skill for researchers throughout all stages in a
study of this nature. For example, basic competency prepares the researcher to assist
participants when needed, such as when locating the option to sign out of a participant’s email account via the screen reader. It also allows researchers to examine,
in real time during the interview, the browsing strategies through the keystrokes. In
our study, we used a combination of the interview questions and the video recording
to interpret browsing strategies and keystrokes. These proved to be helpful, and in
future work, other methods can be explored for capturing participants’ experiences of
interacting with their screen reader. For example, recording only audio and analyzing
the data aurally is worth consideration. Researchers can practice listening to screen
readers at different speeds, and potentially test these screen reader settings’ impact
on warning perception and effectiveness.
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5.2

5.2.1

Key Findings

Findings Consistent with Sighted Users

Common themes that were revealed in our pilot study involving visually impaired
users have been found in previous browser security warning research involving sighted
users. For example, in a study of the correlations between website reputation and
warning adherence for Google Chrome users, Almuhimedi et al. reported several observations that were consistent with our pilot study findings [3]. First, their study
revealed that users are more likely to heed warnings from websites that they are not
familiar with. In our analysis with visually impaired users, familiarity with a website
was the most common reason to ignore a warning. Almuhimedi et al. also found a
dangerous user misconception that users’ antivirus software installed in their operating system protected them from malware, providing users a false sense of security
and causing them to be less likely to adhere to the Google Chrome malware warning.
Our findings revealed a similar sentiment among visually impaired Internet Explorer
users who trusted that the Windows security software protected them from Internet
malware. Lastly, Almuhimedi et al. discovered that the Google Chrome participants
confused malware warnings with SSL warnings. Similarly, one participant in our
study reacted to a malware warning based on her experience with SSL warnings.
As was suggested by Almuhimedi et al., the wording and phrasing in warnings can be
tweaked in order to provide education to users and prevent the common misconceptions that would expose them to security threats. For example, using special language
to warn users when visiting websites that they have visited before, or have a high
reputation generally, can increase warning adherence. Providing education to users
that the browser warning could be preventing a malicious attack that the operating
system’s antivirus software may not protect them from, could also be necessary. Hav47

ing better distinctions between warning types could also provide further clarity to
users.
Warning language impacting participant reactions to a warning was also consistent
with prior research on browser security warnings with sighted users. Akhawe and Felt
observed that the use of the word “untrusted” in the title of a warning contributed to
greater rates of warning adherence, while not being the sole factor [2]. Similarly, our
participants were influenced by warning content that conveyed severity of danger, as
discussed in Chapter 4.3.2.
The prevalence of these themes in both sighted and non-sighted users indicates that
these tweaks to warning design can increase warning adherence universally, whether
they are consumed via visual means or screen reader. As it is important to address the
themes that are found across both populations, future research can deeply examine
the design decisions that are to the most benefit.

5.2.2

Browser Security Warnings Interface Standards

Our findings suggest a number of potential improvements to the user experience of
browser security warnings for the visually impaired. There may be a need for more
uniformity and standardization of language for consistency and to better convey the
meaning of available actions. It is worth consideration to create standards of phrasing
in browser security warnings that provide clear indication as to the destination that a
button or link would lead the user to, as current phrasing has resulted in uncertainty
for visually impaired users.
In addition, standards of page structure and hierarchy of page elements across browser
security warnings could be of benefit, at least within the same browser, and ideally
across all browsers. A normative user interface for warnings that includes a standard
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for the placement of available options would help screen reader users have a more
consistent, useful, and therefore effective, experience when they encounter a browser
security warning. This would allow visually impaired users to more quickly navigate
to the option they are expecting to find, with fewer keystrokes required. When participants decided on their action upon encountering a warning, the common inclination
was to use the DOWN arrow key to iterate through headings and links in order to
find the options available to them according to their mental model developed from
encountering prior warnings. If an expected option is unavailable, such as the option
to proceed to the next page (as was not found to be an option in the malware warning
scenario with U01), there could instead be a disabled button or clear language indicating the lack of that expected option, so that screen reader users are not spending
time trying to hunt for an option that is not there. Having clear and consistent language in browser warnings is most important to the population of users with visual
disabilities, as these users do not benefit from the context of visual indicators such as
graphical elements. These graphics may be missed, ignored, or not interpreted in the
same way when navigating via the screen reader or other assistive technology. Researchers can consider testing and setting guidelines for more consistent, yet effective
warning language and element placement in future work.
It could be argued that uniformity in language and placement of options could instead
endanger users through habituation, which is defined as the “decreased response to
repeated stimulation” [31]. For example, previous work has shown that randomized
placement of option buttons has resulted in users being less likely to ignore the safe
option [11]. However, our review of the literature regarding habituation to security
warnings reveals an examination of the issue only in the context of sighted users, where
a lack of visual consistency assists with users’ security awareness. In a more inclusive
warning design, it is important to weigh the benefits of reduced warning habituation
against the benefit of a design that visually impaired users can navigate in a manner
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that is more predictable, informative, and less time-consuming. Further research is
required to create warning designs that strike this balance of creating inconsistency
for the purpose of safety, yet avoiding confusion for users with disabilities.

5.2.3

Other Ecological Validity Challenges

Other concerns of ecological validity arose. As discussed in Chapter 4.3.5, some of the
participants checked their browser’s notification bar for information or errors upon
encountering a warning, and did not find any additional information or options. It is
unclear whether in a real world context, the participants would have discovered other
indicators in their browser’s toolbar, or if they were referring to older or different
versions of Internet Explorer. In either case, the experience may not be matching
exactly what would have occurred if they encountered a real warning. For example,
Chrome displays a security indicator in the address bar when encountering an SSL
warning. However, none of the participants in this study used Google Chrome. Further research is required to understand visually impaired users’ interaction with these
browser warning elements and their efficacy, by ensuring that the browser will display
the toolbar or address bar elements that would reflect reality.

5.2.4

Implications of Screen Reader Interactions

Our findings reveal new insights and confirm previous work documenting how visually
impaired users interact with websites. As discussed in Chapter 2.2, blind users have
been observed to employ a variety of techniques to “scan” a web page using their
screen reader in the context of online shopping [13, 71, 76]. Our findings confirm
these browsing strategies in the context of browser security warnings; we observe
both previewing or probing, as well as gambling techniques to navigate the warnings.
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Through our observations of what the participants hear when consuming the browser
security warnings via screen reader, we found that the screen reader narration often
includes content that is unexpected or unnecessary. For example, some participants
listened to the screen reader narrate the website title, “Reported unsafe, navigation
blocked ” multiple times prior to narrating the page body. The screen reader also
frequently narrates blank lines, which results in users needing to spend time skipping
past several of them at a time. Lastly, graphical elements are narrated as “Graphic
recommended icon” or “Graphic unrecommended icon” in Internet Explorer, which
does not provide any additional safety measures to the user. It is unclear whether
the screen reader, the website source code, or the browser is primarily responsible for
these issues. Nonetheless, the experience is problematic, and highlights the incongruities visually impaired users suffer due, in large part, to a lack of standards and
coordination between these entities.
These findings have implications on the effectiveness of warnings for this population.
We speculate that the screen reader narrating extra content in a warning could diminish the important messages that are found alongside it, and could contribute to
“warning fatigue,” described by Akhawe and Felt as a situation in which users may
pay less attention to subsequent warnings they encounter [2]. There exists an open
challenge of creating warnings that are hard to ignore, while being accessible and usable to people with disabilities. Again, we have not found any studies that examine
warning habituation and warning fatigue in the context of navigating browser warnings via screen reader or other assistive technology, and thus remains an unexplored
research area.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION

In this paper we attempt to more deeply understand the experience of visually impaired users with the security warnings presented by web browsers. We have developed a research methodology that considers and merges the best practices of conducting human subject research and browser security warnings with those of working with
the visually impaired—a combination previously unexplored in the research literature.
Using this methodology, we conducted a pilot study that observed a group of visually
impaired users employing their own computers, browsers, and assistive software in
an authentic setting. Our investigation reveals that while the use of screen readers
for aiding the visually impaired to interpret the web is prevalent, it is highly incongruous with a usable and secure experience. We find that visually impaired users’
experience is consistent with sighted users with respect to misunderstandings of, and
frustrations with, security warnings, but whose experience is further confounded by
a more inconsistent experience across warning types, and receive no benefit from the
normative security indicators, such as color and iconography.
We propose a set of initial suggestions to better align visually impaired users’ experiences with those of sighted users, perhaps improving all users’ security in the process,
but ultimately conclude that there is a rich body of unexplored research topics and
necessary experimentation to be conducted in the space of usable security and privacy for the visually impaired, particularly with web browsers. We believe our initial
results elucidate some of the compelling issues suffered by this population, and that
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our methodology (and reflections there upon) lays a helpful groundwork for those
looking to repeat or extend this line of inquiry.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT E-MAIL

My name is Elaine Lau and I am a computer science graduate student at Cal Poly, San
Luis Obispo. I am conducting a research project whose goal is to learn how visually
impaired people using a screen reader experience web browser security warnings. For
example, when a web browser displays a warning if the connection to a destination
website is untrusted. Through your participation, we hope this research can directly
contribute to the improvement of accessibility of these warnings in the future.
If you are blind or visually impaired,use a screen reader to access the web, and are
willing to participate please visit this online questionnaire at SurveyMonkey at this
link: [URL]. It will take approximately 10 minutes of your time, is anonymous, and
is intended to learn more about computer usage and perceptions about web security.
The questionnaire will ask if you would be interested in participating in an in-person
interview at a later date.
Thank you for your time and consideration. If you have any questions, please feel
free to contact me by e-mail at [E-MAIL] or phone at [PHONE NUMBER].
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Appendix B
QUESTIONNAIRE

B.1

Informed Consent Form

INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT, “A Research Framework and Initial Study of Browser Security for the Visually Impaired.”
A research project on the accessibility of browser security warnings is being conducted
by Elaine Lau, a graduate student in the Department of Computer Science at Cal
Poly, San Luis Obispo under the supervision of Dr. Zachary Peterson. The purpose
of the study is to learn how visually impaired people using a screen reader experience
security warnings in a web browser.
You are being asked to take part in this study by answering an initial questionnaire
and participating in a video recorded in-person interview at a later date. The questionnaire will ask about your typical computer usage and perceptions about website
security. You may choose to answer the initial questionnaire, but not volunteer for
the in-person interview. If you volunteer to participate in the interview, you will be
asked to navigate to three web pages, each showing an example of a different type
of web browser security warning. There is no real security risk involved. For each
warning, you will be asked about your experience and to think aloud. You will be
asked for permission regarding the placement of the video recorder, which will be used
to capture the screen and use of the keyboard. Your participation will take approximately ten to fifteen minutes for the questionnaire, and one hour for the interview.
Please be aware that you are not required to participate in this research and you may
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discontinue your participation at any time without penalty. You may omit any items
you prefer not to answer in the questionnaire or the interview.
There are no risks anticipated with participation in this study. If you should experience emotional distress or confusion, please be aware that you may contact the
project advisor, Dr. Zachary N.J. Peterson at (805) 756-2088 for assistance. Please
be aware that you may take a short break or period of rest at any point during the
study.
Your confidentiality will be protected by codifying your name in the analysis of the
data and discussion of results so that personally identifiable information will not be
associated with the data, and will not be revealed to others in any form. Potential
benefits associated with the study include an increased and more in-depth understanding of how accessible and usable browser security warnings are for people with
visual impairments, as well as recommendations for making them easier to navigate
via a screen reader.
If you have questions regarding this study or would like to be informed of the results
when the study is completed, please feel free to contact Elaine Lau or Zachary N. J.
Peterson at (805) 756-2088. If you have concerns regarding the manner in which the
study is conducted, you may contact Dr. Steve Davis, Chair of the Cal Poly Human
Subjects Committee, at (805) 756-2754, sdavis@calpoly.edu, or Dr. Dean Wendt,
Dean of Research, at (805) 756-1508, dwendt@calpoly.edu.
If you agree to voluntarily participate in this research project as described, please
indicate your agreement by completing the following questionnaire. Please save an
electronic copy of this form now for your reference, and thank you for your participation in this research.
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B.2

Demographics

This questionnaire is intended to learn about your computer usage and perceptions
about internet security. Thank you for taking this time to complete this questionnaire!

1. What is your gender? (Female, Male)
2. What is your age? (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 to 74, 75
or older)

B.2.1

Your Computer Profile

If you use more than one computer, please answer the following questions to describe
the one you use for web browsing the most.

3. Which operating system do you use when using your primary screen reader?
(Microsoft Windows, Apple Mac OS X, Linux, Other (please specify)
4. Which of the following is your primary desktop/laptop screen reader? (JAWS,
Windows-Eyes, VoiceOver, NVDA, System Access or System Access To Go,
ZoomText, ChromeVox, Other (please specify))
5. How customized are your screen reader settings? (e.g. changed verbosity, installed scripts, etc.) (A lot of customization, Somewhat customized, Slightly
customized, Not at all)
6. If possible, please specify the screen reader customizations you have.
7. Which browser do you use when using your primary screen reader? (Internet
Explorer 9+, Firefox, Internet Explorer 8, Safari, Internet Explorer 6, Internet
Explorer 7, Chrome, Other (please specify))
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8. Please rate your proficiency level for browsing the web using a screen reader:
(Expert, Advanced, Intermediate, Beginner)
9. Do you use other assistive technologies besides a screen reader for browsing the
web? (Yes, No)
10. If yes, please specify the other assistive technologies you use to browse the web:

B.2.2

Security Perceptions

11. How confident are you that your browser is protecting you from danger on the
internet? (Extremely confident, Very confident, Moderately confident, Slightly
confident, Not at all confident)
12. If possible, please explain:
13. Have you ever encountered a security warning while browsing the web? (Yes,
No)
14. If possible, please explain what occurred:
15. Do you have any questions or concerns about web browser security warnings
that you would like to discuss?
16. We would like to conduct an in-person interview to learn about your experience
with web browser security warnings. Please provide your e-mail address and/or
phone number if you would be available in the summer of 2015 and are willing
to participate in an interview.
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Appendix C
CONTEXTUAL INQUIRY

The following interview procedure was submitted to and approved by our University
IRB.

C.1

Special Considerations for Blind and Visually Impaired Participants

• The researcher will not move anything at the interview site without asking first.
Nothing should be moved to a different place than the participant is used to
because the participant cannot see where things are moved.
• The researcher will explain any unusual noises from her activities, such as beginning to record, pausing or stopping the recording.
• If any guide dogs or service animals are present, the researcher will not interact
with them to avoid distracting them.
• For all paperwork, the researcher will provide documents in the participant’s
preferred format.
• The researcher strives to minimize the steps necessary to complete a task since
it can be exhausting to listen to a screen reader while using busy interfaces.
• The researcher will also strive to communicate that the participants are in no
way being “tested” or evaluated for their ability to navigate the warnings.
• The researcher will take steps to minimize capturing any identifying information
using the video recorder.
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C.2

Chronological Description of Events

1. The researcher will brief the participant by introducing herself, and by reading the informed consent form to the participant. The researcher will ask the
participant if they have any questions, and clarify any questions regarding the
reason for conducting the study, procedures involved, potential risks, and how
they can get more information about the study. The researcher will also provide
an electronic copy of the informed consent form using the participant’s e-mail
address.
2. The researcher will request the participant’s signature on the printed informed
consent form. The printed form will have a signature guide, a small piece of
plastic with a window in the middle, to indicate where the signature should
be. If the participant agrees, the researcher will provide a pen and show the
location of the signature guide.
3. The researcher will ask the participant for permission to set up the video
recorder in that location. Upon consent, the researcher will place the video
recorder in a location so that it will aim to capture only the participant’s computer screen and keyboard, maintaining anonymity, and minimizing all other
distractions. With subject’s permission, the researcher may set up an extra
lamp in the room to have adequate lighting for the video recording.
4. The researcher will ask the participant for permission to record audio with the
video recorder. Upon consent, the researcher will ask the participant to use the
computer’s speakers for audio instead of headphones.
5. The researcher will describe the setting displayed in the video recording including the relative position of the participant in the video recording, the screen
display, and keyboard.
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6. The researcher will ask the participant to turn on their computer and open the
web browser that they are most comfortable with.
7. The researcher will ask the participant to sign in to gmail.com using a fake
username and password provided. The researcher will read aloud the username
and password to be entered.
8. The researcher will ask the participant to open a single, unread e-mail that has
been specially crafted to simulate a phishing attempt. The e-mail will contain
a link to a canonical but benign example of a phishing warning page.
9. The researcher will ask the participant to navigate the resulting web page as
they normally would and talk through their experience. The researcher will
ask a series of open-ended questions to learn more. The researcher will communicate her understanding, and ask the participant to expand or correct her
understanding of the responses. After the participant has finished with the
page, or about 10 minutes has passed, the researcher will ask the participant if
they would like to add anything else. The researcher will then move on to the
next warning type.
10. The researcher will then ask the participant if to navigate to a canonical example
of a second warning type (malware warnings) and repeat step 7.
11. The researcher will then ask the participant to navigate to a canonical example
of a third warning type (SSL warnings) and repeat step 7.
12. The researcher will ask the participant if they would like to add anything else.
The participant will be thanked for their time.
13. The researcher will stop the video recording and then remove any extra lighting
and video recording equipment from the room.
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14. The researcher will thank the participant for their time and provide the researcher’s contact information.

C.3

Interview Scripts

Hello! As you know, my name is Elaine Lau, and I’m a computer science graduate
student at Cal Poly San Luis Obispo. My advisor is Dr. Zachary Peterson but I’m
alone here today.
Today we’ll be doing a contextual interview, meaning you’ll navigate two different
types of web browser security warnings. I’ll ask you to think aloud while you navigate
the warnings, about what you’re doing and why you’re doing it. You are essentially
the master, and I’m the apprentice; so I’d like to observe and learn from you about
what works and what doesn’t.
If you ever have any questions about the purpose of the study, procedures, risks, or
anything at all, please let me know and I’ll be happy to answer.
Before you took the survey, you read and agreed to an informed consent form that
included participation in this interview. Please remember that you are not required
to participate in this research, you may discontinue your participation at any time,
and you do not have to answer any questions you choose not to answer. Shall we
begin the interview?
Now there are a couple things to set up first: the video recorder, the lighting, and
audio.
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I have a video recorder to capture the computer screen and keyboard. Is it okay if
I place the video recorder here? The video only captures the computer screen and
keyboard, and does not show your face.
[OPTIONAL] Now, is it okay if I place an extra lamp here so that there is better
lighting in the video?
The next thing is audio. Is it okay if we turn up the audio on the computer, and (if
the participant is using headphones) use speaker instead of headphones?
I’m going to turn on the video recorder now. The video shows the back of your head,
the screen display, and the keyboard. I’m now done setting up and we can start!
(See Warning Scenario Scripts.)
I think it’s time to wrap up this warning. Is there anything else you would like to
mention about this warning page that we haven’t talked about?
Is there anything else you would like to add or do you have any questions? (Wait for
user to respond.)
I appreciate you taking this time out of your day! I’m now going to stop the video
recording. I hope to continue communication with you afterwards while I am writing
up the results so that I have a correct understanding of what I have learned from you
and interpreted from the interview. I may be in contact with you through e-mail if I
have any questions or clarifications, if that’s all right.
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C.4

Warning Scenario Scripts

I will ask you to think aloud while navigating the warnings, about what you are doing
and why you are doing it. You are essentially the master, and I am the apprentice,
so I would like to observe and learn from you about what works and what doesn’t.
I will be taking notes at the same time. If you ever have any questions about the
purpose of the study, and the procedures, or the risks, please don’t hesitate to ask. I
have a video recorder that is capturing the computer screen and the keyboard.
Before you took the survey, you read and agreed to an informed consent form that
included participation in the interview, so please remember that you are not required
to participate in this research, and you may discontinue your participation at any
time. You do not need to answer any questions that you choose not to answer.
Browser: Internet Explorer, Warning Type: Malware

(If the user is using Internet Explorer) First, I want to mention that Internet Explorer
9 has a feature called SmartScreen Filter that blocks phishing and malware websites.
We should make sure Internet Explorer 9 has SmartScreen Filter turned on so that we
can see the browser security warnings. If you agree, could we make sure it is turned
on?
1. Please open Internet Explorer. 2. On top menu, select Tools (ALT+X) (IE 9).
Please look for the Safety menu (4th down from list) 3. Select SmartScreen Filter
from the drop-down list and click on Turn on SmartScreen Filter.
When you’re ready, could you please open Internet Explorer?
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The first security warning I would like to learn about your experience with is the malware warning. Internet Explorer checks the sites you visit against a list of reported
phishing and malware sites. If it matches, then the browser will show a warning
page. The first website I would like you to visit is a demo page created by Microsoft
that triggers the warning. Visiting the page will not cause you any harm. When you
are ready, please navigate to the URL https://malvertising.info. See Appendix C.4
Interview Prompts for subsequent questions.

Browser: Internet Explorer, Warning Type: SSL

The second warning I would like to learn about is the SSL warning. Internet Explorer displays an SSL warning when there is a problem with the website’s security certificate. The website I would like you to visit has an expired certificate.
It is an example page that also does not cause any harm, but it will trigger an
SSL warning in the browser. When you are ready, please type into the address
bar https://expired.badssl.com. See Appendix C.4 Interview Prompts for subsequent
questions.

Browser: Safari, Warning Type: Phishing

When you are ready, please open the Safari browser. The first security warning that I
would like to learn about your experience with is the phishing warning. Safari checks
the websites you visit against a list of recorded phishing and malware sites. If it
matches, then the browser will show a warning page. I would like you to first sign

76

into a fake Gmail account with a provided username and password to see an example
of this. When you are ready, please visit gmail.com and I will provide the credentials.
The username is [USERNAME] and the password is [PASSWORD]. When you are
ready, please sign in.
When you are ready, please read the single unread email. It is an example of a typical
phishing email. The email contains a link to a web page that will trigger a phishing
warning in the browser, and this is only a demo page that Google has provided,
so that we can visit the warning without causing any harm. When you are ready,
please visit the website at the link in the phishing email. See Appendix C.4 Interview
Prompts for subsequent questions.

C.5

Interview Prompts

The following description of the contextual inquiry was submitted to and approved by
our University IRB.

Interviews will be conducted at the user’s home, work place, or other preferred natural setting. The researcher will collaborate with the participant to understand how
they experience the warnings and why. The researcher will share their interpretations
and insights with the participant during the interview. The researcher will ask the
participant to expand or correct her understanding of the responses.

For each warning type, the following prompts and questions will be asked.

1. What is your first reaction when encountering this warning?
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2. Have you encountered a warning like this before?
3. Please do what you would normally do if you encountered this warning, and
think aloud about the steps you are taking if possible.

If the participant has not already tried to proceed through the warning:
4. If you wanted to proceed through the warning and continue to the next page,
please show me how you would do that. If possible, think aloud about the steps
you would take.
5. Why did you do that? How can the interaction be improved?

If the participant has not already tried to go back to the previous page:
6. Please show me how you would go back to the previous page, and think aloud
if possible.
7. Why did you do that? How can the interaction be improved?
8. Is there any information about this page that could be useful, but is not available?

C.6

Phishing Email

The phishing email contents were drawn from a common phishing email at Cornell
University. Cornell University provides examples of phishing emails on their Phish
Bowl webpage at https://it.cornell.edu/phish-bowl.
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Subject Line: Email Account Security info replacement

Body: Someone started a process to replace all of the security info for your Email
Account.

If this was you, you can safely ignore this email. Your security info will be replaced
with 15623535981 when the 5-day waiting period is up.

If this wasn’t you, someone else might be trying to take over your email account.
[Click here to fill in details] and verify your current information in our servers and
we’ll help you protect this account.
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Appendix D
PARTICIPANT RESPONSE DATA

Table D.1: Questionnaire response data, “Your Computer Profile” Part 1
ID
Which browser Please rate your Do
you
use If yes, please
do you use when proficiency level other assistive specify
the
using your pri- for
browsing technologies
other assistive
mary
screen the web using a besides a screen technologies
reader?
screen reader:
reader
for you
use
to
browsing
the browse the web:
web?
U01
U04
U07

U08
U09
U10
U11
U12

Internet Explorer
9+
Internet Explorer
9+
Safari

Advanced

No

(Blank)

Advanced

No

(Blank)

Expert

Yes

Safari
Internet Explorer
9+
Internet Explorer
9+
Firefox

Beginner
Expert

No
No

iPhone,
Windows
browsers
with JAWS and
NVDA.
(Blank)
(Blank)

Advanced

Yes

android

Advanced

Yes

Internet Explorer
9+

Advanced

No

Magic magnification
(blank)
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Table D.2: Questionnaire response data, “Your Computer Profile” Part 2
ID
Which operat- Which of the How
customized If
possible,
ing system do following is are your screen please
specyou use when your primary reader
settings? ify the screen
using your pri- desktop/lap- (e.g. changed ver- reader
cusmary
screen top
screen bosity,
installed tomizations you
reader?
reader?
scripts, etc.)
have.
U01

JAWS

Not at all

(Blank)

Windows-Eyes

Slightly customized

U07

Microsoft
Windows
Microsoft
Windows
Apple Mac OS X

VoiceOver

Somewhat customized

U08

Apple Mac OS X

Win-

Natural
Reader
Adobe
JAWS

AI Squared’s IE
Enhance
I cut down on the
verbosity a lot.
Voice, Speed, and
hot keys

Win-

U04

U09
U10
U11
U12

Microsoft
dows
Microsoft
dows
Microsoft
dows
Microsoft
dows

Somewhat customized
and
A lot of customization

(Blank)

Windows-Eyes

Slightly customized

(Blank)

Win-

JAWS

Not at all

(blank)

Win-

JAWS

Slightly customized

Mostly,
they
are changes to
voice rate and
some visual tracking to support
accessibilityrelated
presentations.
One
thing that may
be important is
my ”forms mode”
setting. I tend to
set it for manual,
rather than auto.
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Table D.3: Questionnaire response data, “Security Perceptions”
ID
How confident If
possible, Have you ever If possible, please
are you that please explain:
encountered
explain what ocyour browser is
a
security curred:
protecting you
warning while
from danger on
browsing the
the internet?
web?
U01

Moderately confident

(Blank)

Yes

U04
U07

Slightly confident
Slightly confident

(Blank)
The Mac is less
problematic than
Windows.

Yes
Yes

U08

Very confident

I feel I have the
discernment to securely operate the
internet

Yes

U09

Very confident

(Blank)

Yes

U10

Moderately confident
Not at all confdient

(Blank)

Yes

So much malware
keeps
getting
loaded onto my
system that it
slows it way way
down.
I try to read about
security and look
at my browser
settings, but I’m
probably someone
who knows enough
to know what she
does not know.

Yes

I get contact has
been blocked warning. The we have

Yes

IE gives warnings
about whether or
not to ”show all content.” And I’ve also
seen warnings about
certificates
that
weren’t up-to-date.

U11

U12

Slightly confident
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Sometimes, a message about a certificate error pops up.
(Blank)
The warning declared
that
my
computer had a
virus.
warnings for downloads and websites,
unless I am familiar
and confident with
the website or software I follow the
wariness advice
Most often, I get
warnings that the
sites are untrusted
and I get an option to look at the
certificate warnings.
(Blank)

Appendix E
WARNING EXAMPLE SCREENSHOTS

Figure E.1: Example of a phishing warning page in Safari.

Figure E.2: Example of an SSL warning popup in Safari.
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Figure E.3: Example of a malware warning page in Safari.

Figure E.4: Example of an SSL warning page in Internet Explorer.
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Figure E.5: Example of a malware warning page in Internet Explorer.
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